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An environmental law focused on ecosystems as the
primary frame of reference, and ecosystem restoration or
preservation as the ultimate goal, is an as-yet unrealized hope
in American law. The desire for such a reorientation of
environmental law is born of the inability of the landmark
environmental statutes of the 1960s and 1970s to
comprehensively halt and reverse tangible environmental
decline-acid rain, agricultural run-off of such severity as to
create huge "dead zones" in our seas, and progressive loss of
wetlands and old growth forests. 1 The laws of the 1960s and
1970s have helped; without them the ecological ills identified
by, for instance, Aldo Leopold in the 1940s would certainly be
worse under the more crowded, developed conditions of today.
The papers presented by Amy Wildermuth and Professor Dan
Tarlock remind us of the roots of the land-health ethic that
informs the idea of ecosystem restoration, as well as the many
practical obstacles to realizing an ecosystem-based
t Partner, Faegre & Benson, LLP, Minneapolis, MN; Adjunct Professor
of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1985, J.D. 1988, Yale
University. The author wishes to thank Melanie Kleiss of the University of
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1. I refer to the following statues: Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136
(2000); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000);
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4370f




I. THE DEPLETED STATE OF OUR PRESENT
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL
In her essay, Amy Wildermuth posits a thought experiment
to illustrate a Leopoldian approach to watershed restoration,
demonstrating a reasoned preference on the basis of a land
health ethic for the use of wetland stream buffers to filter
agricultural runoff as opposed to mini-sewage treatment plants
assumed to be equally efficacious at waste removal. 3 The
choice, however, may not be between wetland buffers or mini-
treatment plants. We seem perennially to get neither, as is
shown in the "extremely threatened" water quality of streams
in Minnesota such as the Minnesota River.4
The Clean Water Act (CWA) has not successfully addressed
nonpoint source pollution.5 One provision of that Act that could
address nonpoint source pollution such as agricultural runoff is
section 303(d), which requires establishment of total maximum
daily loads (TMDLs) of various pollutants to streams, and in
theory mandates regulation of nonpoint polluters to confine
total pollutants to within the parameters set by the TMDLs.6
State water pollution control agencies were to have established
such TMDLs by 1979. 7 By the 1990s, the failure of states to
establish and monitor compliance with TMDLs had left this
provision of the CWA largely unimplemented. 8 Litigation to
compel agency action-such as a federal takeover of state
responsibilities-in the face of delinquent state agency action
has had only mixed success. 9
2. See A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-pragmatic
Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1184-85 (2003); Amy
J. Wildermuth, Eco-pragmatism and Ecology: What's Leopold Got to Do with
It?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1145, 1152-54 (2003).
3. Wildermuth, supra note 2, at 1162-63.
4. This information arises out of a personal communication on February
22, 2003, between the author and Paul Hansen, Executive Director, Izaak
Walton League of America, Inc., Gaithersberg, MD.
5. See e.g., Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. EPA, 84 F. Supp 2d. 1, 4 (D.D.C.
1999) (noting the increased pollution of District of Columbia's waters from
nonpoint sources since the passage of the CWA).
6. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
7. Kingman Park, 84 F. Supp 2d. at 3 (citing Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
8. Id. at 5 (collecting cases).
9. See Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (D. Minn. 1993)
(refusing to order federal takeover of Minnesota's TMDL program). Of 5 U.S.C.
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As the experience of TMDL regulation under the CWA
shows, the current "intellectual capital" of environmental law
has proven largely incapable of handling watershed-wide,
nonpoint source pollution. Certainly from the point of view of
ecosystem restoration, current law has not succeeded.
II. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ECOSYSTEM-BASED
ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES
Can ecosystem-based law get us out of this holding pattern?
The land-health ethic developed by Aldo Leopold is aspirational,
and privately based. To convert it into public policy is the
challenge to those who advocate an explicit legal focus on
ecosystem restoration.
The ecosystem-based legal initiatives of the 1990s relied
almost entirely on the goodwill of the administrative state to
implement them.10 Such efforts are fatally subject to the defects
in agency culture identified by Tarlock. These programs
incorporate a facade of stakeholder input, typically through a
lengthy solicitation of public comment in connection with
drafting an environmental impact statement (EIS) pursuant to
the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).11 They
§ 706(1), the provision in the Administrative Procedure Act that directs courts
to compel agency action unreasonably delayed or denied, Professor Davis once
titled a section in his treatise, The Courts Consistently Ignore and Violate a
Provision of the APA That Is Both Clear and Valid. 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23:9 (2d ed. 1983).
10. Examples include federal initiatives during the Clinton administration
to restore natural waterflows to the Everglades, and to restore natural apex
predators to the northern Rocky Mountain states. See e.g., Comprehensive
Everglades Restoration Plan, Pub. L. No. 106-541, 114 Stat. 2572 (2000). The
administration successfully reintroduced wolves to Yellowstone National Park
and designated wilderness areas in central Idaho under the Endangered
Species Act. See Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n V. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224, 1241
(10th Cir. 2000) (upholding wolf reintroduction against a variety of legal
challenges). This success came, however, at the cost of adopting regulations
that left wolves largely at risk outside of designated "recovery zones." See
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. §17.84 (2001) (wolf
reintroduction rule). A similar effort to reintroduce grizzly bears into areas of
the northern Rockies from which they have been extirpated has been shelved
by the Bush administration. Fish and Wildlife Service, 66 Fed. Reg. 33620
(proposed June 22, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. p. 17) (recommending
selection of a "no action" alternative on grizzly bear reintroduction).
11. Too often, this process leads to a bloated EIS that is of little use as a
decision-making tool. The EIS for the Yellowstone wolf reintroduction
program, for instance, attracted over 160,000 comments! Wyo. Farm Bureau
Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished administrative
record) (on file with author). Conversely, because agency officials fail to
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ultimately enshrine, however, the final bureaucratic weighing
of human and environmental interests found in 1960s-era
resource management statutes such as the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.12
Ecosystem-based program initiatives are not presently
susceptible to effective judicial review. At least since the early
1990s, with the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation,13 challenges to ecosystem-wide agency
actions have faced a constant threat of dismissal as
unmaintainable "programmatic" assaults on government policy.
The current Supreme Court's hostility to citizen suit review of
agency action is part, but not all, of the story. The current
disclose that NEPA does not create a stakeholder-driven decisional process, but
rather exists in the usual realm of agency-driven decisional processes, public
reaction to such documents often tends toward cynical exasperation, as there is
no way to confirm the impact, if any, of stakeholder input on agency decisions.
See Katharine Q. Seelye, Flooded With Comments, Officials Plug Their Ears,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, § 4, at 4 (noting that 80% of 360,000 comments
received on the Bush administration's proposal for increased snowmobiling in
Yellowstone National Park favored banning the machines). Burdening NEPA
in this fashion undermines public support for the concept of environmental
review, and enables actions such as the Bush administration's present
attempted mugging of the NEPA statute through a "reform" task force. See
Nat'l Envtl. Policy Act Task Force, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,510 (July 9, 2002); see also
Cory Reiss, Changes to Environmental Laws Likely in GOP Senate, MORNING
STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), Nov. 18, 2002, at 1A, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File, All; Behind the Smokescreen: White House's
'Wildfire' Bill to Weaken Environmental Protection, Public Rights in Federal
Land Management Decisions, Analysis Shows, ASCRIBE NEWSWIRE, Sept. 9,
2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, All; All Things
Considered: Environmentalists Claim Bush Administration is Undermining the
National Environmental Policy Act (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 14,
2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, All.
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2000). I am not an absolute proponent of
stakeholder-based decisional processes. Having participated directly in such
processes involving the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness and
Voyageurs National Park, both in northern Minnesota, and having been an
interested observer of a "roundtable" process to develop a Minnesota state wolf
management plan, my experience is that such ad hoc processes systematically
overrate local preferences, and current legal frameworks provide no assurance
to participants that even positive outcomes of stakeholder processes will be
enacted. See Richard A. Duncan and Kevin Proescholdt, Protecting the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, 76 DENVER U. L. REV. 621, 649-51
(1999); see also DOUGLAS S. KENNY, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW CENTER, ARGUING ABOUT CONSENSUS: EXAMINING THE CASE
AGAINST WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE
GROUPS IN ACTIVE NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (2000), available at
http://www.colorado.edu/Law/NRLC/Publications/RR23.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,
2003).
13. 497 U.S. 871, 898-99 (1990).
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battle between South Dakota and its recreationists on the one
hand, and barge owners in Missouri on the other, over the Army
Corps of Engineers' management of flow rates on the Missouri
River demonstrates the possibility of confusing and often
directly conflicting judicial decisions in reviewing agency
actions on a watershed or larger basis.14
There is no unified legal construct yet in place to put
ecosystem health at the center of administrative decision
making. Because the current form of ecosystem-based program
initiatives are essentially an administrative overlay to existing
environmental statutes, 15 such initiatives are susceptible to
essentially unreviewable political and administrative
backsliding.
CONCLUSION
We are likely now in a time of quiescence in the
development of ecosystem recovery as a goal of American
environmental law. The initiatives that have occurred at the
federal level were largely the work of former Secretary of the
14. See State of South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, Nos. 022187, 022191, 022305
(8th Cir. May 21, 2002) (granting stay of potentially conflicting district court
orders regarding the Army Corps of Engineers' management of the Missouri
River); see also Corps Appeals River Rulings, ABERDEEN AMERICAN NEWS
(S.D.), May 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 19710328; Mark Henckel, Water
Fight, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Mont.), May 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL
11823340.
15. Some existing environmental statutes can more directly support
ecosystem restoration initiatives than others. The Endangered Species Act, for
instance, has an ecosystem-restorative cast, particularly in its critical habitat
designation provisions. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533. The ESA admittedly has less of
a land-health ethic focus than an animal-health ethic focus. That focus served
the statute well when it was first passed in 1973, when public concern was
intense for North American species such as the bald eagle and gray wolf, as
well as various African and Asian fauna far from the designs of any American
real estate developer. The animal-specific focus has served the statute less
well when the critter at issue is, for instance, the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving
Fly. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043-45 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). In such situations, the public
might be more likely to support a land-health ethic approach which protects
the health of the ecosystem of which the fly is a part. See also Endangered Fly
Stalls Some California Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at 28.
The Wilderness Act, an explicitly preservationist tool, can have ecosystem
restorative effects in large-scale use, such as in Alaskan wilderness areas. The
creation of exceptions to the rigorous strictures of wilderness preservation in
the name of an expansive use of the statute for ecosystem restorative efforts is
not, however, a strategy I would endorse.
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Interior Bruce Babbitt. 6  The present administration is
unlikely to see much benefit to its programmatic goals of
resource development and extraction from ecosystem
restoration initiatives.1 7
To imbed ecosystem restoration into environmental law will
require a fundamental reformation of the statutes governing
public land management and regulation of air and water
pollutants, to create identifiable standards and criteria for
study and decision making, and tools for meaningful judicial
review of the substantive outcomes of such administrative
processes. This task is staggering and will not be undertaken
by the current administration. If attention is not turned to this
project by the middle years of this decade, ecosystem restoration
risks becoming the NASDAQ of environmental law-the hot
new idea of the 1990s, whose overhyped promises of success are
followed by a devaluation so sharp as to alienate public support
from a project necessary to renew the legal intellectual capital
on which our nation's environmental health relies.
16. David J. Hayes, Land Conservation and Restoration: Moving to the
Landscape Level, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 115, 116 (2002); John D. Leshy, The
Babbit Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A Preliminary Review, 31
Envtl. L. 199, 226 (2001).
17. See Douglas Jehl, On Environmental Rules, Bush Sees a Balance,
Critics a Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at Al.
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